CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY
BAPCPA Amendment to the Bankruptcy Code: An Unconstitutional
Restriction on an Attorney’s Right of Free Speech. Hersh v. United States, 347
B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
By Matthew A. Petrie
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”) amended the Bankruptcy Code to include provisions that arguably
apply to consumer bankruptcy attorneys and the manner in which they advise
potential clients. The BAPCPA amendments added a definition for “debt relief
agency” in section 101(12A). BAPCPA further added section 526, which places
restrictions on the advice that a debt relief agency can provide to its client, as well as
section 527, which requires certain disclosures by the debt relief agency. The
Northern District of Texas in Hersh v. United States was the first court to address
whether an attorney is a “debt relief agency” under the Bankruptcy Code and, if so,
whether the restrictions and required disclosures under sections 526 and 527 are
constitutional.
The plaintiff, Susan Hersh (“Hersh”), was an attorney whose practice
included counseling clients on matters of bankruptcy law in exchange for a fee. As a
result, she was potentially subject to the regulations of debt relief agencies; therefore,
she sought a declaratory judgment that BAPCPA does not apply to attorneys and
that both sections 526 and 527 violate the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The government moved to dismiss Hersh’s claims. Hersh raised three
primary issues in this case.
As a threshold matter, the first issue that the court had to decide was
whether the term “debt relief agency” includes attorneys. The court concluded that
under a plain reading of the statute, attorneys are debt relief agencies under the
Bankruptcy Code. A debt relief agency is “any person who provides any bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2007). Moreover, the definition of
“bankruptcy assistance” in section 101(4A) includes giving advice. Because only
attorneys are authorized to provide legal advice, and attorneys were not listed as one
of the five exceptions to the definition, the court found that bankruptcy attorneys
such as Hersh must fall within the definition of “debt relief agency.” As such,
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attorneys are subject to the regulations set forth in sections 526 and 527 for debt
relief agencies.
The second issue decided by the court was whether section 526(a)(4), which
prohibits debt relief agencies from advising clients to take on more debt in
contemplation of bankruptcy, was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. While
Hersh argued that the provision should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, the court
held that the section was over-inclusive and therefore could not survive even under
intermediate scrutiny, thereby avoiding the issue of determining which standard
applies. Both tests, however, require that a restriction on speech be narrow. Section
526(a)(4), however, was not narrow because it prevented attorneys from advising
clients to take actions that are entirely lawful, even after BAPCPA, and it extended
beyond abuse to restrict advice to take prudent actions. Because section 526(a)(4)
prevented lawyers from advising clients to take action that is lawful and extended
beyond what is narrow and necessary to serve the government’s asserted interest in
preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system, the court held that it was facially
unconstitutional.
The third and final issue before the court was whether the numerous
disclosures required by section 527 unconstitutionally compelled speech. Section
527 requires attorneys to provide clients or potential clients with written notice of
specific information regarding the bankruptcy process. The court found section 527
constitutional because it did not unduly burden either the attorney-client relationship
or the ability of the client to seek bankruptcy relief. The court relied on a line of
Supreme Court decisions addressing statutes that required a member of a profession
to provide customers with information regarding the services that would be
provided. The court also found that the government “clearly has a legitimate interest
in attempting to ensure that a client is informed of certain basic information”
because consumer debtors are often at an informational disadvantage. Furthermore,
nothing in section 527 prevented an attorney from providing further specific
explanations concerning the general required statements. Because the contentneutral statements required by section 527 were a sufficiently narrow means to
ensure that clients are aware of general information regarding bankruptcy, this
section did not violate the First Amendment.
Although the court in Hersh determined that attorneys are debt relief agencies
under the Bankruptcy Code and that section 526(a)(4) is unconstitutional, it is only
one of a handful of district courts to address these issues; other courts may not
answer these important questions the same way. The Code provides for recovery of
fees and for damages for even negligent violations of these sections. It is therefore
important, not only for consumer bankruptcy attorneys, but any attorney who
advises clients or potential clients on any bankruptcy related matter (and therefore is
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a debt relief agency) to ensure that he or she complies with the requirements set
forth in the Bankruptcy Code for debt relief agencies.
___________________
The Till Rate is the Proper Rate of Interest to be Paid on Secured Claims
under Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Shaw, 341 B.R.
543 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
By Drew H. Reynolds
In order to determine whether to confirm a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan,
bankruptcy courts must examine section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
1325(a) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if the plan meets the
requirements of nine numbered paragraphs and one unnumbered paragraph. One of
these paragraphs, section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), requires that creditors’ claims be paid in
full, either at the time of confirmation of the plan, or over time with interest. The
paragraph does not, however, specify what rate of interest debtors must pay in order
to satisfy the confirmation requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Consequently, this
question came before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina, Durham Division, in In re Shaw.
On November 29, 2005, Shaw (“Debtor”) filed a petition for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Some time before filing her
petition, the Debtor purchased an automobile. In order to finance the purchase, the
Debtor borrowed from Allegacy Federal Credit Union (“Creditor”) and, as security
for repayment, granted the Creditor a lien on the automobile. Both parties agreed
that this purchase took place within the 910 days prior to the Debtor’s filing. The
Chapter 13 trustee filed a Notice and Proposed Order of Confirmation of the
Debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan, which proposed bifurcating the Creditor’s claim into
secured and unsecured portions and did not require the Debtor to surrender the
automobile. The Creditor objected to the plan because of the proposed bifurcation.
The parties disputed only one issue: What rate of interest, if any, must the
Debtor pay on the amount owed to the Creditor in order to satisfy the confirmation
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code? While the Creditor argued that the contract
interest rate was the proper rate, the Debtor argued that no interest was due on the
claim. Both parties agreed, however, that if the court did not accept their arguments,
the Bankruptcy Code would require interest to be paid at “the Till rate,” an interest
rate established according to procedures outlined by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
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In order to resolve the issue at hand, the court first had to determine the
relationship among sections 1325(a) and 506 of the Bankruptcy Code and the
“Hanging Paragraph”—an unnumbered paragraph at the end of section 1325(a).
According to section 1325(a), the court shall confirm a Chapter 13 plan if the plan
meets the requirements of nine numbered paragraphs, as well as the Hanging
Paragraph. The Hanging Paragraph provides, in relevant part:
For purposes of [section 1325(a)(5)], section 506 shall not apply to a
claim described in that paragraph if . . . the debt was incurred within
the 910-day [sic] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and
the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired
for the personal use of the debtor . . . .
Both parties agreed that the Hanging Paragraph applied to the Creditor’s claim;
consequently, they agreed that section 506, which permits bifurcation of the
creditor’s claim into secured and unsecured portions, did not apply. The parties
disagreed, however, on the effect of the inapplicability of section 506. The Debtor
argued that the Hanging Paragraph, by making section 506 inapplicable, made all the
provisions of section 1325(a)(5) inapplicable, creating a new class of claims which
would be paid in full with no interest. The Creditor argued that without the
valuation method provided for in section 506(a), secured claims covered by the
Hanging Paragraph were required to be paid with the interest rate provided for in the
original contract.
The court did not agree entirely with either argument. It dismissed the
Debtor’s argument that the Hanging Paragraph made section 1325(a)(5) inapplicable
to certain secured claims, reasoning that, to agree with the Debtor’s point, it would
have to conclude that a creditor could not be truly secured under the Bankruptcy
Code. Furthermore, the court found that state law initially determines a creditor’s
rights, which may then be altered by a relevant portion of the Bankruptcy Code.
State law, therefore, determines a creditor’s secured status, while the Bankruptcy
Code determines the treatment of secured claims. In making section 506
inapplicable to certain claims, then, the Hanging Paragraph did not strip secured
claims of their status. Thus, the court held, section 1325(a) continued to apply to
such claims.
The plan did not meet the requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(C) because it
did not call for the Debtor to surrender her vehicle, and it did not meet the
requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(A) because the Creditor did not accept the plan.
Therefore, the court found, the relevant portion of section 1325(a)(5) was subsection
(B). Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) states that the creditor is to receive “the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of
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such claim” and such value may not be “less than the allowed amount of such
claim.”
According to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Till, this paragraph requires the
creditor’s claim to be paid in full, either at the time of confirmation of the plan or
over time with interest. In Till, the Court provided detailed instructions on how
courts should calculate the appropriate rate of interest. When Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),
it did not change the language of Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Because of Congress’s
presumed knowledge of the Till decision and its decision not to change the relevant
language when it enacted BAPCPA, the court held that the Till rate remained the
interest rate that must be paid to meet the requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Consequently, the confirmation of the Debtor’s plan was denied.
The court’s holding in Shaw provides several valuable lessons for
transactional attorneys. As Shaw illustrates, the Hanging Paragraph does not strip
claims of their secured status; therefore, section 1325(a) continues to apply to such
claims. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires that the creditor’s claim be paid in full,
either at the time of confirmation or over time with interest. Furthermore, the
court’s holding in Shaw demonstrates that the Till rate is the proper interest rate with
which secured claims must be paid in order to meet the requirements of section
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Corporate Veil . . . or Bulletproof Vest? Canter v. Ebersole, No. E2005-02388COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2006).
By Kevin Dean
In Canter v. Ebersole, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Hamilton
County Chancery Court’s dismissal of Mr. Canter’s action to pierce the corporate veil
of Windward Pointe Townhomes, LLC (“WPT”) and hold its sole member, Richard
Ebersole, personally liable for a breach of contract judgment. This case
demonstrates the difficulty an attorney in Tennessee faces when attempting to pierce
the corporate veil.
In the underlying breach of contract suit, the Chancery Court of Hamilton
County awarded Canter a $67,515.79 judgment against WPT. WPT did not pay the
judgment, and Canter filed suit to pierce the corporate veil and hold Ebersole
personally liable on the judgment.
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Canter introduced several arguments for piercing the corporate veil in this
case. First, he cited the fact that WPT was administratively dissolved on March 16,
2001 (prior to this lawsuit) and was not reinstated until after the judgment was
awarded for breach of contract. The court found these facts irrelevant because,
under TCA 48-217-101(b), limited liability “continues in full force regardless of any
dissolution, winding up, and termination of an LLC.” Second, Canter cited the fact
that Ebersole failed to follow customary company formalities to document loans he
personally made to WPT. However, the court held this argument irrelevant as well,
since failure to follow normal company formalities “is not a ground for imposing
personal liability” on LLC members under TCA 48-217-101(e). Third, Canter argued
that WPT was undercapitalized (WPT’s initial capitalization was only $1,000), but
this argument failed because the court found WPT was adequately capitalized after
taking into consideration the loan funds that were personally guaranteed by Ebersole.
Canter’s fourth argument was that Ebersole dominated WPT. After WPT’s
only other member withdrew in April of 2001, Ebersole had sole ownership of WPT
and exclusive authority to write checks on WPT’s account and borrow funds on its
behalf. Ebersole was operating the business out of his home and using his personal
cell phone for WPT business. This dominance argument failed as well because the
court found that, although the facts indicated dominance, no evidence was presented
showing Ebersole used his dominance to defraud or conduct an illegal operation.
Finally, Canter argued that Ebersole’s management of WPT should weigh
heavily in favor of piercing the corporate veil. He emphasized that debts of creditors
other than Canter were paid, and Ebersole even used WPT’s last $20,000 to pay
debts the LLC owed to him. The court held Ebersole’s payment of WPT’s debts
while he was personally liable does not establish an ulterior motive to defraud
creditors. The court also emphasized that Ebersole loaned WPT a total of
$369,556.99 and was repaid less than half—$146,697.07. Additionally, nothing in the
record indicated Ebersole used WPT to engage in any unlawful acts.
The Canter case demonstrates the uphill battle a practitioner faces when
attempting to pierce the corporate veil. Here, the court emphasized that piercing the
corporate veil is only appropriate in extreme circumstances, that no single factor is
conclusive, and that it should only be used “to prevent the use of a corporate entity
to defraud or perform illegal acts.” See Muroll Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Tenn. Tape, Inc.,
908 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). To succeed in an action to pierce the
corporate veil, practitioners must be able to show that a corporate entity was used to
defraud or perform illegal acts in order; however, following Canter, the corporate veil
appears to be very nearly a bulletproof vest.
___________________

2007]

CASE COMMENTARIES

451

Deepening Insolvency in Delaware: Corporate Directors Can Sink the Ship as
Deep as They Want . . . as Long as They’re Not Trying To. Trenwick Am.
Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. et al., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006).
By Christopher B. Kelly
In Trenwick America v. Ernst & Young, the Delaware Chancery Court held that
causes of action for deepening insolvency are not recognized under Delaware law.
Considering a claim by the litigation trust of an insolvent corporation against its
directors and advisors, the court recognized that the business judgment rule
presumes the business decisions of directors are proper and that the presumption
may not be rebutted simply by a showing that deeper corporate insolvency resulted
from the challenged corporate decisions.
Trenwick Group, Inc. (“Trenwick”) was a publicly-traded insurance holding
company comprised of various international subsidiaries. From 1998 to 2003,
Trenwick adopted a growth strategy that resulted in the acquisition of various other
publicly-traded insurance companies. A subsequent reorganization made Trenwick’s
top U.S. subsidiary, Trenwick America Corporation (“Trenwick America”), the
intermediate parent of all of Trenwick’s U.S. operations and significantly increased
the percentage of Trenwick’s overall debt assigned to Trenwick America as
guarantor.
Unfortunately for Trenwick, it underestimated the potential claims exposure
of many of the insurance companies it acquired during its growth. As a result, the
claims made by Trenwick’s insureds eventually exceeded Trenwick’s capacity to pay
the claims and its debt. By 2003, Trenwick and Trenwick America had become
insolvent, and both filed for bankruptcy within the year. In response to the
companies’ filings, a litigation trust was created and was assigned all causes of action
owned by Trenwick America.
In 2006, the litigation trust filed suit in Delaware Chancery Court against
former directors of Trenwick, former directors of Trenwick America, and some of
Trenwick’s former advisors, challenging two of Trenwick’s significant acquisition
transactions. In its suit, the litigation trust made claims of breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and a somewhat unconventional claim of “deepening insolvency.” With the
litigation trust’s case suffering from multiple pleading deficiencies, including a
complaint lacking facts to support an inference that Trenwick was actually insolvent
at the time of the transactions, the Chancery Court decided the case on the pleadings
and elected to dismiss all of the litigation trust’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and fraud. The court’s dismissal of the litigation trust’s deepening insolvency claim,
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however, required no such examination of the facts; Delaware law simply does not
recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action.
As evidenced by the countless number of companies it incorporates,
Delaware has long been a leading authority on corporate law in America. A
fundamental principle codified in its corporation law is the business judgment rule,
which operates as a judicial presumption that, in any given case, corporate directors
have acted in the best interest of their corporation, on a fully informed basis, and in
good faith. This presumption is based on the court’s recognition that the directors
of a corporation are generally in the best position to make informed business
decisions and that, absent evidence of fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty, courts
should not judge those decisions in hindsight, regardless of their financial outcome.
Vice Chancellor Strine recognized in Trenwick America v. Ernst & Young that this rule
should apply to corporate directors not only in their efforts to increase company
profitability in times of success, but also in efforts to move out of insolvency in
times of despair. By the same logic, Delaware law does not recognize deepening
insolvency as a cause of action.
In Trenwick, the litigation trust claimed that Trenwick and Trenwick America
were insolvent when their directors elected to acquire other insurance companies and
that the acquisition resulted in financial loss and deeper corporate insolvency. The
flaw in the claim is that it is predicated on the result of the directors’ business
decision (deeper insolvency) and not on the propriety of the decision itself (good
faith and full information). The deeper insolvency claim demands compensation for
the negative outcome of the decision, disregarding the presumptions of the business
judgment rule. The litigation trust essentially asked the court to assume that, because
the acquisitions made by Trenwick resulted in deeper insolvency, the directors must
have engaged in some sort of actionable conduct. Under Delaware law, the legal
presumption is the opposite. Delaware courts assume that directors of a corporation
acted in good faith and on a fully informed basis unless the plaintiffs can rebut those
presumptions with particularized facts. The litigation trust failed to do so, and, as
the court stated, “may not cure that deficiency simply by alleging that the
corporation became more insolvent as a result of the failed strategy.”
The court focused on the nature of the business decision and noted that,
“even when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith, strategies
to maximize the value of the firm.” In relegating the litigation trust to traditional
causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, the court supported the
legal principle that the directors of a corporation should be positioned to make
informed business judgments, but not to be guarantors of a particular business
strategy’s success. Further, this principle does not waver in times of insolvency.
Delaware law “requires the directors of an insolvent corporation to consider, as
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fiduciaries, the interests of the corporation’s creditors.” Such directors cannot be
said to have breached that duty simply by implementing a business plan that proves
to be unsuccessful.
The Trenwick decision does not modify or reinterpret any rule of Delaware
law but makes clear that the business judgment rule should be applied equally to
corporate directors operating profitably as well as struggling business enterprises.
Regardless of the company’s financial situation, the business decisions of the
directors must be presumed proper. As Vice Chancellor Strine put it, “the fact of
insolvency does not render the concept of ‘deepening insolvency’ a more logical one
than the concept of ‘shallowing profitability.’”
___________________
The Board’s Failure to Take Action Regarding Board Member Misconduct
May Result in a Derivative Action Against Board Members for Violation of
Their Fiduciary Duties to the Corporation. Memphis Health Ctr., Inc., v. Grant, No.
W2004-02898-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (July 28, 2006).
By Charles R. Frazier
The Board of Directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation requires it to do
what is in the best interest of the corporation, even when that requirement may harm
the Board or its individual members. On appeal, the court in Memphis Health Center,
Inc., v. Grant affirmed the trial court’s decision to remove the Board for its failure to
remove or investigate the Board Chairman for conduct unbecoming of a Board
member, in violation of company bylaws and the Board’s fiduciary duty.
Chief Executive Officer Holman (“CEO”), Sadie Davis, and Cornelia Berry
of Memphis Health Center (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a verified complaint
against the Board members of Memphis Health Center (“Defendant” or “Board”).
The complaint sought injunctive relief, both temporary and permanent, prohibiting
the Board from, inter alia, violating the bylaws of Memphis Health Center, violating
the rules and regulations of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), violating Holman’s employment contract with Memphis Health
Center, and interfering with the day-to-day operations of Memphis Health Center.
The Chancellor subsequently entered an order directing the Board to
conduct a meeting to determine whether Holman should be suspended with pay
during the prosecution of the instant derivative suit. A court appointed Special
Master reported on the Board’s resolution, which claimed that Holman had “covered
up” sexual harassment complaints and had not informed the Board of the matter.
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The Special Master stated that the suspension with pay was “not to be construed . . .
as termination” of Holman’s employment.
In its answer, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs did not meet the
requirements for a derivative action, in part because Holman, as an ex officio nonvoting member of the Board of Directors, did not qualify as a “director” within the
meaning of the applicable statutes. The Defendants also asserted affirmatively that
the Board had acted appropriately, exercising sound business judgment.
The trial court concluded that Holman was a member of the Board for the
purposes of Tennessee’s derivative action statute. The court also found that
Plaintiffs Davis and Berry were members of the Board, and that the amended
complaint stated sufficient justification for excusing the demand. Consequently, the
trial court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The trial court found that the Board had an affirmative obligation to address
conduct unbecoming a Board member, and a particular obligation to at least
investigate the judgment of violation of the federal False Claims Act against
Chairman Grant. The trial court also found that the bylaws authorized the Board to
select as well as dismiss the CEO, but that it had no authority to suspend the CEO
with pay. On this basis, the trial court found that the suspension of Holman with
pay was a violation of the injunctive order. The Defendants were found in contempt
and they appealed.
Generally, the proper party to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a corporation is
the corporation itself, acting through its directors or a majority of its shareholders.
The derivative action is a limited exception to this rule. “Essentially, a derivative
action is a suit brought by one or more members, directors, or shareholders of a
corporation, on a corporation’s behalf to redress an injury sustained by or to enforce
a duty owed to, a corporation.”
To guard against misuse of the derivative action, preconditions to such
lawsuits are imposed. Section 48-56-401 of the Tennessee Code Annotated sets
forth the requirements for a derivative action filed on behalf of a nonprofit
corporation. The court reviewed only those provisions relevant to the instant action.
First, to bring a proceeding on behalf of a domestic or foreign corporation to
procure a judgment in the corporation’s favor, the plaintiff must be a “director” of
the corporation. Second, each plaintiff must be a director at the initiation of the
proceeding. In addition, several pleading requirements must be fulfilled. The
complaint must be verified and must allege, with particularity, the demand made to
obtain action by the directors. It must explain either why the action sought from the
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directors was not obtained or why no demand was made on the directors. This is
known as the demand requirement.
Here, the Defendants contended that Holman was not a “director” of
Memphis Health Center, as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56401(a)(2), and therefore had no authority under the statute to bring a derivative
action on behalf of Memphis Health Center. Tennessee Code Annotated section 4851-201(10) defines “director” as “natural persons, designated in the charter or bylaws or
elected by the incorporators . . . to act as members of the board, irrespective of the
names or titles by which such persons are described.” Article III, section 3,
subsection d (read in conjunction with other provisions) of the Memphis Health
Center bylaws governs the composition of the Board of Directors; it states that the
CEO is an “ex-officio non-voting member to the Board.” The court concluded that,
considering all of the bylaw provisions, an ex officio member of the Memphis Health
Center Board of Directors falls within the meaning of the term “director” in section
48-51-201(10) and therefore has standing to maintain a derivative action against the
corporation.
Section 48-56-401(c) of the Tennessee Code Annotated requires a derivative
action complaint to “allege with particularity the demand made, if any, to obtain
action by the directors . . . or why [the plaintiffs] did not make the demand.”
Tennessee case law provides that the demand requirement may be excused.
Typically, in a “demand excused” case, a plaintiff claims that a demand would be
futile because the board is interested and not independent, and, consequently, the
court examines the interest and independence of the corporate decision-makers.
In this case, the amended complaint alleged that any demand “would be
futile in that the Defendants have a direct interest in continuing to breach their
fiduciary duty and violate the Bylaws and federal rules and regulations, and,
therefore, are not independent.” The trial court heard this argument as part of the
Defendants’ oral motion to dismiss; it noted that while the evidence at trial might
show that the demand should not be excused, the allegation in the amended
complaint was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. Thus, the court found no
error in the trial court’s conclusion on this issue.
The Defendants next argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion
to dismiss because the derivative action was brought without being verified.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56-401(c) provides that a complaint in a
derivative action must be verified. The Defendants acknowledged that the original
complaint was verified by Plaintiff Holman, but contended that she was not
competent to do so because, as only an ex officio Board member, she had no standing
to file the derivative action. As noted above, the court concluded that, under the
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circumstances of this case, Holman had standing to file the lawsuit, and therefore her
verification of the original complaint was sufficient. Thus, the court found no error
in the trial court’s holding on this issue.
Without citation to authority, the Defendants asserted that a violation of the
bylaws of a corporation, a violation of an employment contract, and a violation of
federal rules and regulations are not recognized causes of action on behalf of a
corporation in Tennessee. From the court’s review of the amended complaint,
however, the Plaintiffs primarily alleged a breach of the Board members’ fiduciary
duty to the corporation. It is undisputed that the directors of a corporation owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation to “faithfully pursue the interest of the
organization, and its nonprofit purpose, rather than his or her own financial or other
interests, or those of another person or organization.” If the directors breach their
fiduciary duty, they may be held jointly and severally liable to the corporation.
Consequently, this argument was held to be without merit.
Here, one of the Plaintiffs’ primary allegations was that the Board Chairman
was found to have committed thousands of violations of the federal False Claims
Act, and that the Board refused to take action to remove him or even to investigate,
and that this inaction was a violation of their fiduciary duty to Memphis Health
Center. This allegation was clearly actionable. Consequently, this argument was also
held to be without merit.
As the Memphis Health Center case illustrates, a Board of Director’s fiduciary
duty requires it to pursue the interests of the corporation, even when corporate
interests conflict with the interests of the Board or its individual members. Ex officiotype provisions can be used as a check and balance against a self-serving Board, thus
promoting integrity in corporate governance. Because the unchecked power of a
Board of Directors could harm a corporation, transactional lawyers should advise
corporate clients to include provisions in their bylaws that will give corporate officers
standing to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation.
___________________
Negligence Claim Cannot Sustain Deepening-Insolvency Cause of Action. In
re CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672 (3rd Cir. 2006).
By D. Leigh Griggs
Under Pennsylvania law, only fraudulent conduct is sufficient to support a
deepening-insolvency claim; allegations of negligent conduct do not qualify. This
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was the issue decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
In re CitX Corp.
In In re CitX Corp., a debtor-Internet company (“CitX”) was involved in an
illegal Ponzi scheme and used its financial statements, compiled by its accounting
firm, to attract investors. CitX’s only significant customer, Professional Resources
Systems International, Inc. (“PRSI”), was a fraudulent enterprise and was shut down
by the Florida Attorney General. At the time that PRSI’s business was terminated, it
owed CitX 2.4 million dollars. The PRSI receivable remained an asset on CitX’s
balance sheet long after PRSI was shut down, thus permitting CitX to show a
positive balance sheet. Thereafter, CitX was able to raise more than one million
dollars in equity, thereby prolonging its existence. Within eighteen months, CitX
spent the investors’ money, incurred millions more in debt, and subsequently filed
bankruptcy. A bankruptcy trustee was appointed; the trustee sued the accounting
firm and the accountant responsible for compiling the financial statements for,
among other things, “deepening insolvency.” The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the accounting firm. The trustee appealed
In determining whether summary judgment on the deepening-insolvency
claim was proper, the court of appeals first examined the trustee’s complaint. The
trustee alleged that the accounting firm missed many “red flags” and that it should
have known about the errors in the financial statements that eventually caused harm
to the company. The court noted that the complaint scarcely made out, and the
evidence fell short in sustaining, any claim of fraudulent conduct on the accounting
firm’s part. Without fraud, the trustee had to depend solely on his claim that the
accounting firm negligently deepened the company’s insolvency. Thus, the court had
to determine whether a claim of negligence could support a deepening-insolvency
cause of action.
In addressing this question, the court returned to its only other opinion
dealing with “deepening insolvency”: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3rd Cir. 2001). In Lafferty, the court defined “deepening
insolvency” as an injury to the debtor’s company property from the “fraudulent
expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.” While noting that
certain cases support the contention that a claim of negligence could suffice to
sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of action, the court rejected this position,
stating that Lafferty held only that fraudulent conduct would sustain a deepeninginsolvency claim under Pennsylvania law. The court found no reason to extend the
scope of deepening insolvency. Holding that a claim of negligence could not
support a deepening-insolvency cause of action, the court affirmed the judgment
below, maintaining that the trustee failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
to support the allegation that the accounting firm engaged in fraudulent conduct.
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Although popular belief following the Lafferty decision was that Third Circuit
courts were more receptive to the deepening-insolvency issue than other courts, the
In re CitX Corp. case signals a willingness of the Third Circuit to reconsider Lafferty’s
holding that “deepening insolvency” is a cause of action under Pennsylvania law. At
the very least, it appears clear that In re CitX Corp. has made future claims of
deepening-insolvency harder to plead and maintain. Before bringing future
deepening insolvency claims, plaintiffs should determine which state’s law applies
and review the case law to determine the particular elements that must be pled to
allege fraud. In defending a claim of deepening insolvency, one should question the
validity of the claim as a separate cause of action in the state in which the complaint
is brought, and also question whether it is duplicative of an existing cause of action
under state law, such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.
___________________
The Business Judgment Rule Expanded in Disney. In re the Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
By Rachel O. Park
Delaware law presumes that, in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
actions taken are in the best interest of the company. In In re the Walt Disney Company
Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the Board of
Directors of the Walt Disney Company were entitled to this presumption when they
(1) drafted and agreed to the Ovitz Employment Agreement (“OEA”); (2) fired
Michael Ovitz, president of the company, without cause; and (3) paid Ovitz the
contracted-for severance payment, valued at approximately $130 million, even
though he had only worked at Disney for 14 months.
In 1994, the Disney Board of Directors decided to name a president and
future successor to the late President Frank Wells and interim President Michael
Eisner. The prime candidate for the position was Michael Ovitz, the leading partner
and one of the founders of Creative Artists Agency (“CAA”), a premier talent
agency.
Because of the income Ovitz received from CAA, Disney’s Board realized
that several financial assurances would have to be promised to Ovitz in order to
assure that he would leave CAA and join the Disney team. As such, Irwin Russell, a
Disney director and chairman of the compensation committee, began negotiating the
financial terms of Ovitz’s employment agreement (“OEA”).
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The first draft of the contract was modeled after Eisner’s and Frank Well’s
employment contracts. In addition to the draft, Russell prepared a “case study” for
Ovitz and Eisner to explain the terms of the OEA, including the extraordinary level
of compensation that Ovitz would be receiving. Russell also hired an executive
compensation consultant to help him evaluate the financial terms of the OEA.
Concerned with the annual income Ovitz would receive over the course of his fiveyear OEA, approximately $23.9 million, and his ability to receive an additional
windfall of $50 million under the current wording of the OEA, Russell began
rewording the draft OEA.
However, before Russell and the compensation consultant were able to
determine a reasonable compensation package, Eisner and Ovitz agreed to a separate
OEA. On August 14, 1995, Eisner and Ovitz signed an agreement, which outlined
the basic terms of the OEA, and stated that the agreement would be subject to the
approval of Disney’s compensation committee and Board of Directors. After the
agreement was signed, Eisner and Russell called the members of the Board and the
compensation committee to inform them of the impending new hire, to explain
Eisner’s friendship with Ovitz, and to detail Ovitz’s qualifications. That same day,
public reaction to Ovitz’s hiring was extremely positive. Disney was applauded for
the decision, as its stock price rose 4.4% in a single day, thereby increasing Disney’s
market capitalization by over $1 billion.
On September 26, 1995, the Disney compensation committee met to discuss
the proposed terms of the OEA. The topics included the historical comparables of
Ovitz’s contract to that of Eisner and Wells, as well as the size of the option grants.
The committee unanimously concluded that it had enough information to approve
the terms of the OEA.
Immediately after the compensation committee meeting, the Disney Board
met to discuss the OEA. Eisner led the discussion relating to Ovitz. Raymond
Watson, a member of the compensation committee, discussed the financial analysis
used by the committee in approving the OEA. Both Watson and Russell answered
questions from the Board. After further deliberation, the Board voted unanimously
to elect Ovitz as President.
Ovitz’s tenure as President of the Walt Disney Company officially began on
October 1, 1995. The initial reaction was positive. However, over time opinions
towards Ovitz began to change. By the fall of 1996, the Disney directors were
resigned to the fact that Ovitz would most likely have to be terminated.
On September 30, 1996, the Disney Board met to discuss Ovitz and his
future employment with Disney. Eisner told the board members of the continuing
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problems that he and others were having with Ovitz, of his own personal lack of
trust of Ovitz, and of Ovitz’s failures to adapt to Disney’s culture. After this
meeting, Eisner began searching for ways to relieve Disney of its obligations to pay
Ovitz his severance payout under the OEA. He began negotiations with Sony to
“trade” Ovitz. These negotiations, however, quickly dissolved. Additionally, Eisner
began working with Sanford Litvack, Disney’s General Counsel, to explore whether
the company could terminate Ovitz “for cause,” thus relieving Disney of its
severance payout obligation under the “non-fault termination” provision in the
OEA.
After consulting Val Cohen, co-head of Disney’s litigation department,
Joseph Santaniello in Disney’s legal department, and “anybody else that [Eisner]
could find that had a legal degree,” it was determined that no basis existed to
terminate Ovitz “for cause.” Moreover, Litvack believed that attempting to avoid
legitimate contractual obligations by forcing Ovitz to negotiate for a smaller nonfault termination severance payout would harm Disney’s reputation as an honest
business partner and would affect its future business dealings.
Following a Board meeting on November 25, in which the Board determined
that Ovitz’s termination was inevitable, Eisner set up a meeting with Ovitz to discuss
his termination. After discussing several concessions, all of which Eisner rejected,
Ovitz walked off the Disney property for the last time on December 11, 1996.
Ovitz’s termination was memorialized in a letter, dated December 12, 1996 and a
press release was issued that same day. Shortly thereafter, Disney paid Ovitz what
was owed under the OEA for a non-fault termination.
One month after that payment, shareholders of the Disney Corporation
brought derivative actions on behalf of the Disney Corporation against Eisner and
the board of directors (“Defendants”) claiming, among other things, that because
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the Delaware General Corporation
Law, their actions should not be protected under the business judgment rule. The
Court of Chancery for the County of New Castle ruled in favor of the Defendants,
finding that the director Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties and, as
such, were protected by the business judgment rule. Disney’s shareholders timely
appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court,
holding that the Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties because no
reasonably prudent fiduciary would have acted differently. Thus, the court
concluded that the Defendants’ decisions to approve Ovitz’s employment
agreement, to hire him as president, and then to terminate him on a no-fault basis
were protected business judgments made without any violation of a fiduciary duty.
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In so holding, the court explained that Delaware law presumes that, in
making a business judgment, the directors of a corporation act in an informed basis,
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of
the company. Those presumptions can only be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that
the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith. If
that is shown, the burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the
challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
On appeal, Plaintiff shareholders argued that Defendants violated their
fiduciary duties by approving the OEA with a non-fault termination provision that
resulted in an enormous payout without informing themselves, at the time the OEA
was drafted, of the full magnitude of that payout. The trial court and the Delaware
Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument and held that the Board was
reasonably informed when it made its decision. Despite the imperfections, the court
stated, the evidentiary record was sufficient to support the conclusion that the
compensation committee, Eisner, and the entire Board had adequately informed
themselves of the potential magnitude of the entire severance package, including the
options that Ovitz would receive in the event of an early non-fault termination.
Although not in compliance with corporate governance “best practices,” the court
concluded that there was still enough evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding that the Board was reasonably informed. Moreover, the Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that, even if Defendants were grossly negligent in their
decision to hire Ovitz, grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot
constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.
Because Plaintiff shareholders were unable to carry the heavy burden of
showing that the Defendant directors of the Walt Disney Company breached their
fiduciary duty of care or acted in bad faith, the business judgment rule protected the
actions of the Board.
CONTRACT LAW
Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Provision in Employment Contract
Determined Using Prospective Approach. Anesthesia Med. Group, P.C. v. Buras, 25
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 441, 2006 WL 2737829 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2006).
By Jennifer G. Rowlett
A liquidated damages provision in an employment contract will be upheld if
it satisfies enforceability requirements when analyzed from a prospective approach.
In Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reaffirmed
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the prospective approach established in Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn.
1999) with its decision to enforce the liquidated damages provision of a medical
group employment contract against a breaching employee.
In Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras, Paul Buras, a registered nurse,
applied and was accepted into a sponsorship program with Anesthesia Medical
Group (“AMG”) in which AMG sponsored the education of students seeking to
become certified registered nurse anesthetists (“CRNAs”) in exchange for their
future employment with AMG. Buras executed a contract with AMG on March 24,
1999. The contract provided that AMG loan Buras up to $22,500 for tuition in
exchange for Buras’s promise to work for AMG at the conclusion of his CRNA
training and certification.
By entering the contract, Buras promised to begin full-time employment with
AMG within thirty days of CRNA certification and promised to work for AMG for a
period of three years. Successful completion of the three-year commitment resulted
in forgiveness of the tuition loan. Alternatively, the contract provided that failure to
satisfy the three-year commitment to AMG at the conclusion of the CRNA program
obligated Buras to repay the tuition loan as well as additional payments. The
additional payments enumerated in the contract were $15,000 if he resigned or was
terminated for cause within the first twelve months of employment; $10,000 if the
same occurred during the second twelve months; and $5,000 if it occurred during the
third twelve months.
Buras borrowed the entire $22,500 available from AMG, completed the
CRNA program, and started work for AMG on November 7, 2001. However, on
July 18, 2002, Buras sent a letter of resignation to AMG, declaring his intention to
pursue work as a locum tenens, a temporarily employed CRNA who receives a daily
wage instead of an annual salary. Buras’s last day of work with AMG was on August
16, 2002.
AMG filed suit on October 25, 2002 seeking to enforce the contract against
Buras. Breach of contract was not at issue because Buras admitted his breach. Thus,
the trial court awarded AMG partial summary judgment and ordered Buras to repay
the tuition loan as well as some other fees and costs. The liquidated damages issue
went to trial. The trial court found the $15,000 liquidated damages provision
unenforceable as a penalty to the breaching party.
On appeal, the court analyzed the enforceability of the liquidated damages
provision by applying the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.
In Guiliano, the Court adopted a prospective approach to the fundamental
requirements of a valid liquidated damages clause. Those requirements are (1) that
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the amount of damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of actual
damages that would likely be sustained in the event of a breach and (2) that the
actual amount of damages must be difficult to determine. Also, a liquidated damages
provision will not be enforced if it is found to be a penalty to the breaching party as
opposed to a reasonable way to ensure that the non-breaching party will be
compensated for damages. The Guiliano holding calls for these requirements to be
evaluated at the time the parties entered the contract.
Thus, the court examined the AMG employment contract using the
prospective approach and ultimately held that the liquidated damages provision was
enforceable. First, the court determined that AMG would suffer foreseeable
damages if Buras failed to complete the three-year employment commitment because
of the significant costs involved in finding temporary and permanent replacements to
cover Buras’s duties. Second, the court held that it would be difficult to estimate the
actual amount of damages that AMG would suffer at the time of contract formation
because of unpredictable facts such as the timing of breach. Finally, the court
determined that the agreed amount of liquidated damages specified in the contract
($15,000) was a reasonable prediction of the amount of potential damages that AMG
would incur in replacing Buras if he failed to complete his employment commitment.
Hence, by utilizing a prospective method of analysis, the court determined that the
liquidated damages clause was valid, and by enforcing the clause, the court was
adhering to the parties’ original intentions. The court awarded judgment to AMG in
the amount of $15,000 in liquidated damages based upon the contract provision.
As Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras illustrates, Tennessee courts
determine the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an employment
contract based upon its reasonableness at the time of contract formation. Thus, the
continuing challenge for drafters of employment contracts is to prepare liquidated
damages provisions that are reasonable predictions of potential damages in the event
of breach.
___________________
Joining the Majority: Tennessee Changes Its Statute of Frauds. Blair v.
Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681 (Tenn. 2006).
By Scott Griswold
The Tennessee Supreme Court and General Assembly have amended the
statute of frauds to provide that the “party to be charged” is the party against whom
enforcement of the contract is sought. This amendment modifies the previous rule
that the “party to be charged” is limited merely to the seller of real property. This
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modification brings Tennessee in line with the majority view. Tennessee’s statute of
frauds, which is consistent with many other jurisdictions, states that “no action shall
be brought, . . . upon any contract for the sale of lands, . . . unless the promise or
agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged.” Prior to the
Supreme Court’s and legislature’s policy shift, the lower courts were bound to an
antiquated and minority view that the statute was a “defensive tool for the owner of
real property.”
In Blair, Rena Mae Blair, the plaintiff/appellee, sold improved real property
to Rollin and Mary Ann Brownson, the defendants/appellants, at a foreclosure
auction conducted by a local attorney. Following the sale, the attorney drafted a
deed conveying the property in fee simple to the Brownsons. Ms. Blair’s lawfully
authorized agent signed the deed, but did not deliver it to the Brownsons. The
Brownsons never signed the deed. Subsequently, the Brownsons had the property
appraised; however, the appraiser’s report stated the house was worth significantly
less than the purchase price. As a result, the Brownsons reduced their offer for the
property to match the appraised value. Ms. Blair demanded the original purchase
price, but the Brownsons refused to close the transaction, announcing that they no
longer wanted the property.
Ms. Blair sued and sought specific performance of the contract for sale of the
land. In their answer, the Brownsons asserted that the statute of frauds provided an
affirmative defense since the agreement was for the sale of real property and only the
seller had signed the deed. The trial judge granted Ms. Blair’s request for specific
performance. The Brownsons appealed the order and raised the following issue for
review: “whether the deed, which was drafted after the foreclosure sale and signed
only by [Ms. Blair’s agent], suffices to satisfy the statute of frauds.” Judge Susano,
writing for the Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial
court and held that, “in light of our precedent, we find the deed has been signed by a
lawfully authorized agent of the party to be charged” and, therefore, the statute of
frauds was satisfied. While the Court of Appeals noted there was relatively little case
law concerning the matter, it asserted that any changes in public policy had to come
from either the Supreme Court or the legislature.
In the wake of the intermediate appellate court’s ruling, the General
Assembly amended Tennessee’s statute of frauds to expressly state that the “party to
be charged is the party against whom the enforcement of the contract is sought.”
This statutory change bolstered the Supreme Court’s rationale, which stated that
“buyers and sellers should receive equal protection in the process of the sale of land
so that neither stands to be unduly benefited or disproportionately burdened by the
fact that the contract has not been reduced to writing.” The Supreme Court
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expressly overruled previous precedents that construed the “party to be charged” as
the seller and reiterated the new rule stated in the statutory modification.
Consequently, sellers of real property will not be able to sign a deed and then
use it as a sword to force buyers into specifically performing oral contracts. Seeing
the potential for abuse in the real property market, Tennessee’s policy makers
reacted quickly and concisely to return the statute to its intended defensive position.
The new interpretation of the “party to be charged” clarifies this important area of
the law and adds predictability for practitioners in advising their clients.
INSURANCE
Unambiguous Language is Necessary for Insurance Subrogation Rights.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. 2006).
By Nicholas C. Zolkowski
Insurance companies may utilize subrogation rights to “step into the shoes”
of an insured party in order to inherit that party’s payment rights. Allstate Insurance
Company v. Watson, however, illustrates the importance of language and intent in
contracts, and how they can ultimately affect the insurance company’s subrogation
rights.
Kevin Williams (“Williams”), the owner of a duplex, leased a unit of the
residence to Robert Watson (“Watson”). The lease contained a clause that stated
Watson would be “responsible for all damages to the apartment, intentional or nonintentional.” Williams later procured a fire insurance policy through Allstate
Insurance Company (“Allstate”) in case of fire damage.
In June 1995, a fire occurred and damaged the duplex unit. Williams was
neither intentionally nor negligently responsible for the fire. The amount of damages
was $25,788.47. Allstate paid Williams the cost of the damages. Allstate then sued
Watson under a subrogation claim, as Watson would have been liable to Williams
had no fire insurance policy existed.
The trial court construed the “intentional or non-intentional” language of the
lease clause to mean that Watson was strictly liable for all damages to the duplex, and
ruled in favor of Allstate’s subrogation request. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Williams and Watson were co-insureds
and therefore had no hierarchy of rights for Allstate to subrogate.
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The Supreme Court analyzed the issue of subrogation based on the language
of the contract. In order for Allstate to have a subrogation right, its insuree,
Williams, would need to be entitled to payment from Watson, and that right would
be construed from the lease contract. The court stated that it would usually interpret
a contract to discern the parties’ intent based on the literal meaning of the language
used, unless the language was ambiguous. If the language was found to be
ambiguous and to potentially have more than one meaning, then parole evidence
could be used to determine the true intent of the parties.
The court found the lease clause ambiguous because the term “nonintentional” could be interpreted as meaning either “strictly liable” or “negligently.”
Therefore, parole evidence was necessary to ascertain what Watson and Williams
intended the clause to mean, and the contract drafter was brought to testify. The
drafter stated that Watson and Williams had not intended to hold Watson strictly
liable, but only for negligent or intentionally caused damages. Watson would have
needed to be responsible to some degree of fault in order to be liable to Williams.
The court therefore held, based on this clarified construction of the lease, that
Watson was not liable. Since Watson was not liable to Williams, Allstate was barred
from subrogating, and the case was dismissed.
This case demonstrates the importance of using precise and clear language in
contracts that explains conditions thoroughly. While the intended meaning may be
obvious to the drafters, third parties may misconstrue slight ambiguities into
unintended meanings. This case also demonstrates that if a party desires to use any
subrogation rights, it should take precautions to ensure it is entitled to do so.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Absent Allegations of Fraud, State Law Claims Based on Activities that
Occurred During Federal Patent Prosecution will be Preempted by Federal
Patent Law. Coker v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. W2005-02525-COA-R3-CV, 2006
Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006).
By Melissa C. Hunter
Any state cause of action that conflicts with federal patent laws is preempted
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Nevertheless,
claims derived from state laws that overlap with federal patent laws may escape
preemption if the laws do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
patent objectives. State laws that impose liability on patent-holders who obtained
the patent through deliberate fraud before the Patent and Trademark Office do not
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interfere with the purposes of federal patent laws; as such, lawsuits based on these
laws will not necessarily be preempted. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed
dismissal of a complaint that sought to impose state tort liability based on actions
protected by federal patent laws in Coker v. Purdue Pharma Co.
The lawsuit in Coker followed on the heels of an opinion rendered in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The defendant
Purdue Pharma Company (“Purdue”) holds patents for the drug OxyContin. After
Purdue learned that a generic drug company sought to manufacture and sell a drug
equivalent to OxyContin before the expiration of Purdue’s patents, Purdue filed a
patent infringement suit against them in the district court. The district court held
that Purdue committed inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), which rendered their OxyContin patents unenforceable. Based on that
decision, Coker filed a class action suit against Purdue in a Tennessee state court
alleging three causes of action: Tennessee Trade Practices Act violations, Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act violations, and common law monopolization. Purdue
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings before the state trial court. The trial
court granted Purdue’s motion and dismissed Coker’s complaint. Coker appealed,
asserting that the complaint was sufficient to avoid federal preemption and that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that state
laws conflicting with federal law must be preempted. In determining whether
preemption is appropriate, a court must look to the congressional purposes to
determine if the state law serves as an obstacle to those federal purposes. The
United States Supreme Court has held that laws punishing individuals for fraud in
obtaining a patent do not interfere with federal patent law objectives; however, the
Federal Circuit has held that federal patent law prevents state tort law liability based
on actions occurring before the PTO unless “the conduct amounted to fraud or
rendered the application process a sham.” Accordingly, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that Coker’s complaint must be dismissed unless it alleges fraudulent
conduct before the PTO.
The appellate court in Coker determined that the
complaint did not contain allegations that Purdue engaged in fraud before the PTO
when it was prosecuting its patents for OxyContin. Coker argued that the United
States District Court’s determination that Purdue acted inequitably establishes the
requisite fraud to avoid preemption. The court of appeals rejected this argument,
noting the difference between inequitable conduct and fraudulent conduct. Next,
the Coker court examined the complaint itself. The complaint alleged that Purdue
made “material misrepresentations” before the PTO, but these allegations fell short
of fraud, defined as an intent to deceive.
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Lawyers drafting complaints for claims arising from a patent-holder’s
representations before the PTO should not file suit in a state court unless the
complaint contains sufficient allegations of fraudulent conduct. Since the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure contain heightened pleading requirements for fraud, the
alleged fraudulent conduct must be stated with particularity. As Coker illustrates, to
avoid preemption and dismissal of a suit, complaints alleging state law claims that
overlap with federal patent laws must be written carefully to demonstrate that the
state law claims do not interfere with federal patent law objectives.
INTERNET
Defamation in Cyberspace: Who Is Immune From Liability Under The CDA
and What Constitutes A “User” Under the Act? Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510
(Cal. 2006).
By Jessica A. Webb
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) often has been
interpreted as conferring broad immunity against defamation liability for those who
publish information on the Internet that originated from another source. The CDA
provides in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” The Act further provides in
section 230(e)(3) that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The
court in Barrett v. Rosenthal ruled on three issues: (1) whether section 230 of the CDA
applies to distributors as well as publishers; (2) the definition of the statutory term
“user;” and (3) whether the immunity provision of section 230 made a distinction
between active and passive users of the Internet. The court held that section 230
prohibits distributor liability for Internet publications and that there is no distinction
between active and passive use of the Internet.
The plaintiffs in Barrett operated web sites devoted to exposing health frauds;
the defendant operated an Internet discussion group. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant committed libel by maliciously distributing defamatory statements via emails and Internet postings that impugned the plaintiffs’ character and competence
and disparaged their efforts to combat fraud.
The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion to strike under an anti-strategic lawsuit against public
participation statute, but the court of appeals vacated the order insofar as it applied
to one of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals held that section 230 did not shield the
defendant from liability under the common law of defamation as a “distributor.”
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The Supreme Court of California held that the CDA immunity provision
applied to distributors, that the term “user” in the CDA immunity provision applied
to an individual such as the defendant, and that there is no distinction between active
and passive users of the Internet. Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs were
limited to pursuing the originator of the allegedly defamatory publications.
The court took into account two main considerations in determining whether
distributors were liable under section 230. First, the court started its analysis by
evaluating the leading case on section 230 immunity: Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). The court agreed with the decision in Zeran and held that
allowing distributor liability would dramatically impact Internet service providers.
Congress did not intend to create a distributor exemption to the immunity provided
in section 230. Second, the court rejected the court of appeals’s use of three factors
in its analysis: the meaning of “publisher,” the legislative history of the CDA, and the
practical implications of notice liability.
The court next considered the definition of the term “user.” First, the court
noted that the court of appeals’s “distributor” liability theory did not distinguish
between Internet service providers and individuals; the court then made comparisons
between the two. The court noted that the term “user” is not defined in the statute
and proceeded to determine the meaning of the term by using the rules of statutory
construction. The court also noted that Congress consistently referred to “users” of
interactive computer services and specifically included “individuals” in section
230(b)(3). The court stated there was no reason to believe that Congress meant the
term to have a different meaning in section 230(c)(1) and concluded that the
defendant, although an individual, was therefore a “user” under the CDA.
Finally, the court analyzed whether there was a distinction between active
and passive Internet use since one of the plaintiffs urged the court to restrict the
statutory term “user” to those who engage in passive use. The plaintiff contended
that passive users would include those who merely receive offensive information,
along with those who screen and remove such information. The plaintiff further
contended that active users are those who actively post or republish information on
the Internet and that they are “information content providers” unprotected by the
statutory immunity. The court held that Congress intended the term “user” in the
CDA to refer to “anyone using an interactive computer service, without
distinguishing between active and passive use.”
The court’s holding in Barrett establishes that Internet intermediaries are
exempt from defamation liability for republication. This is an important holding for
a modern society where electronic media such as Internet forums, newsgroups, and
chat rooms are becoming increasingly prevalent in everyday life. As this trend
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continues, business practitioners need to be concerned with whether they could be
held liable for their participation in this developing medium.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
The Scope of the Anti-Retaliation Provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Extends Beyond Employers’ Workplace or Employment-Related
Actions Against Employees. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126
S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
By Matthew Avery
The Supreme Court recently held that the anti-retaliation provision of section
704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not coterminous with the substantive
discrimination provision and, therefore, is not limited to employer’s actions affecting
an employee’s terms, conditions, or status of employment that occur at the
workplace. Specifically, the Court held that a reassignment of duties without a
demotion, as well as a thirty-seven-day unpaid suspension (though later rescinded
with back pay), could potentially constitute retaliatory discrimination within the
provision’s scope. The Court also held that the anti-retaliation provision requires
showing that a reasonable employee would have found the employer’s challenged
action materially adverse—the action could well have dissuaded a reasonable
employee from taking protected action against his or her employer.
In September 1997, Sheila White was working as a forklift operator in the
Maintenance of Way department at Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company’s Tennessee Yard. White, the only female in her department, complained
to company officials that her immediate supervisor had repeatedly told her that
women should not be working in that department and made inappropriate and
insulting remarks to her in front of the men in her department. Burlington
disciplined the supervisor and simultaneously removed White from forklift duty,
assigning her to dirtier and more arduous track laborer tasks. White filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
asserting that her reassignment amounted to unlawful gender-based discrimination
and retaliation.
Several days after filing her complaint with the EEOC, White had a
disagreement with her immediate supervisor, and White was immediately suspended
without pay. White invoked internal grievance procedures, which resulted in
Burlington concluding that she had not been insubordinate. White was then
reinstated and awarded back pay for the 37 days she was suspended.
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White subsequently filed a claim in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee, asserting that the reassignment and thirty-seven-day
unpaid suspension amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. A jury found in favor of White, awarding her
compensatory damages. On appeal, a Sixth Circuit panel initially reversed and found
for Burlington on the retaliation claims, but the full court of appeals, later hearing
the matter en banc, affirmed the district court’s judgment in White’s favor.
In deciding the matter, the members of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
differed in opinion as to the proper standard to apply in determining retaliatory
discrimination. Several circuit courts disagreed on how close a relationship must
exist between the retaliatory action and employment for it to be actionable under the
provision. The Sixth Circuit majority applied the same standard for retaliation that
they applied to a substantive discrimination offense, holding that the challenged
action must result in an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of
employment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute among the
circuit courts. The Court held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII was not
to be construed as narrowly as the substantive discrimination provision because the
limiting words found in the latter provision are conspicuously absent from the
former. The Court held that the purposes of the two provisions differ, and the
intended result of the substantive discrimination provision is a workplace free from
discrimination. The intended result of the anti-retaliation provision, on the other
hand, is the prevention of employer interference with employees’ efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act; there are many effective forms of retaliation that
would not be precluded under a narrower interpretation of the provision.
The Court also held that the anti-retaliation provision covers only employer
actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or
applicant. This holding requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged action “may
well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” The standard is phrased generally because the significance of any
retaliatory act may depend entirely on the particular circumstances surrounding the
act.
Employment law practitioners should take note that the definition of
“retaliation” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision has been interpreted to cover
employer actions that are not directly work-related. The standard of a “reasonable
employee” for the materiality requirement is a very general one that is highly
susceptible to such factors as the individual employee’s history and circumstances.
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Accordingly, employers should be advised to exercise caution and to follow
established procedures to avoid adverse actions.
___________________
Where a Management Retention Agreement Provides for Voluntary
Termination of Employment for Changes in the Nature and Scope of
Authority, Justification of Such Changes does not Present a Dispute in
Material Fact Such that Summary Judgment may be Avoided. Gray v. Shoney’s,
LLC, No. M2005-00923-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 31, 2006).
By Jonathan W. Robbins
At issue in Gray v. Shoney’s, LLC, is whether an executive who voluntarily
terminates his employment based on conditions contained in a Management
Retention Agreement (“MRA”) is entitled to severance compensation. This case was
decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Division, upon appeal from
summary judgment from the Chancery Court for Davidson County.
While experiencing financial difficulties and facing the prospect of a change
of control, Shoney’s, Inc. secured MRAs with certain executive employees in order
to induce their loyalty through the turbulent times. Bernard Gray, then Chief
Information Officer, entered into one of these MRAs, which provided a liberal
severance package if, within two years of a change in control, he voluntarily
terminated his employment for good reason. Among the various descriptions of
what would constitute “good reason” under the MRA was the provision that a
“significant change in the nature or scope of Executive’s authority” constituted good
reason.
After a 2002 change of control, Gray’s entire department was moved from
being directly under the control of Shoney’s, Inc., to being under the control of a
wholly-owned subsidiary, Captain D’s Restaurants. After the change, Gray reported
to the Operations President of Captain D’s rather than directly to the Chairman of
the Board of Shoney’s, Inc., as he had previously done. Furthermore, Gray was no
longer allowed to begin or to control research and development projects without
prior approval, to make any expenditures without prior approval, to sell used
equipment without prior approval, to control the customer comment line and
Mystery Shopper programs, or to exercise discretion in certain personnel matters.
Based on all these changes, Gray submitted his resignation, claiming “good reason”
as defined by the MRA and seeking the severance package also contained in the
MRA. Shoney’s, Inc. declined his severance package. At trial, the Chancellor
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concluded that significant changes had occurred and granted summary judgment on
behalf of Gray.
At issue before the court of appeals is whether genuine disputes regarding
material facts exist as to the “good reasons” for which Gray contends he is entitled
to terminate his employment and receive severance compensation. Finding that no
material facts were in dispute as to whether Shoney’s had made a significant change
in the nature or scope of Gray’s authority, the grant of summary judgment was
affirmed.
In interpreting the MRA, the court accorded the contractual term
“significant” its natural and ordinary meaning, which it defined as a change that has
meaning or is likely to have effect on the nature or scope of his authority. In Gray’s
motion for summary judgment, evidence was provided of significant changes in his
research and development authority, spending authority, authority to sell used
equipment, authority over programs, personnel discretion, and changes in the
structure of his department and the reporting tier. However, Shoney’s provided no
material facts bearing on whether the changes in the nature or scope of Gray’s
authority were significant.
Shoney’s response provided many persuasive
justifications for these changes based on the troubled financial structure of the
company; however, these arguments did not address whether the changes were
significant. Describing the arguments provided by Shoney’s as a “factual detour, like
a trip through the soup and salad bar,” when more substance, “like a healthy portion
of country fried steak,” was required, the court found that there were no material
facts in dispute concerning whether a significant change occurred and upheld the
grant of summary judgment.
Based on the holding in this case, it is clear that, while justifications for
corporate actions are persuasive, they are only a “factual detour” where an active
MRA provides that good cause can be shown based simply upon significant change
in nature or scope of authority. Where there is no provision that allows for
temporary or justified changes, the nature of these changes is not important. Thus,
when drafting and negotiating a MRA, the practitioner should always remain mindful
of exactly what type of provision is desired and under what circumstances and
conditions voluntary termination of employment will result in severance
compensation.
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TAXATION
D.C. Circuit Stuns Tax Lawyers by Declaring I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
Unconstitutional for Taxing Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress.
Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
By John L. Fuller
In August 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stunned both the tax bar
and constitutional lawyers alike with its opinion in Murphy v. IRS. A unanimous
panel declared unconstitutional the application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) that excludes
from personal income damages received as compensation for “personal physical
injuries or physical sickness,” while permitting the taxation of damages awarded for
mental distress and loss of reputation. The opinion firmly questions the income
taxing authority of Congress as well as the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment itself.
Needless to say, many in the legal community are bewildered by the D.C. Circuit’s
conclusions. For now, however, any potential effects of Murphy have been put on
hold. On December 22, 2006, the D.C. Circuit, sua sponte, vacated its previous
opinion and scheduled the case for oral argument on April 23, 2007. Though the
ultimate outcome is uncertain, a summary of the facts of the case and an analysis of
this extraordinary opinion is useful to illustrate how a common understanding of our
income taxing mechanism can be called into question by a clever argument and a
ready court.
Murphy v. IRS arose out of a suit to recover income taxes paid on
compensatory damages awarded in an employment discrimination suit. In 1994,
while employed by the New York Air National Guard (“NYANG”), Marrita Murphy
alerted state authorities to environmental hazards on a NYANG air base. As a
result, Murphy was allegedly “blacklisted” and received unfavorable references from
the NYANG to potential employers. Murphy subsequently filed a complaint with
the Department of Labor which found in her favor and remanded the case to an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to determine appropriate compensatory damages.
During the damages phase, Murphy presented evidence of “somatic” and
“emotional” injuries, including bruxism, an involuntary grinding of the teeth
associated with stress causing permanent tooth damage. After finding that Murphy
had suffered from “‘physical manifestations of stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks,
shortness of breath, and dizziness,’” the ALJ awarded compensatory damages
totaling $70,000, including $45,000 for “emotional distress or mental anguish” and
$25,000 for “injury to professional reputation.” These findings and awards were
affirmed by the Department of Labor Administrative Review Board in 1999.
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In 2000, Murphy reported the $70,000 on her tax return and paid $20,665 in
income taxes on the award. Soon thereafter, she filed an amended return seeking a
refund for the taxes previously paid on the damages award. Murphy based her claim
on her belief that she had received her award “on account of personal physical
injuries” and, therefore, the award was excluded from gross income under section
104(a)(2). Ms. Murphy presented her medical records in support of her position.
The IRS denied her claim on the basis that her medical records were not sufficient to
prove her damages were awarded for “physical injury” in light of the ALJ’s decision
citing “emotional distress or mental anguish.” Murphy then sued the IRS and the
United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Murphy argued, first, that her compensatory award was received for
“personal physical injuries” and should be excluded from gross income under section
104(a)(2). In the alternative, she argued that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional in
its application by excluding from gross income compensation for “physical injuries”
while permitting compensation for “emotional distress” to be taxed. The District
Court denied Murphy’s claims on the merits and granted summary judgment for the
Government and the IRS. The D.C. Circuit Court accepted the case for de novo
review.
The circuit court first determined that the district court did not have proper
jurisdiction over the IRS as a defendant. Citing federal agency immunity statutes, the
circuit court held that the IRS could not be sued as an agency under these
circumstances and should have been dismissed. The United States remained a
proper defendant.
The court then evaluated section 104(a)(2) and its application to Murphy’s
awards. Murphy again contended that her award, regardless of the ALJ’s
characterization, should fall within the meaning of section 104(a)(2) because of the
physical attributes of her injuries. The Government countered by pointing out that
the statute’s language had been consistently interpreted by courts to require a “strong
causal connection” between damages to be excluded and a personal physical injury
or physical sickness upon which the underlying suit was based. In other words, only
damages awarded because of personal physical injuries or physical sickness could be
excluded from gross income.
Though the ALJ considered the physical
manifestations of Murphy’s injuries, the damages awarded were expressly “for
emotional distress or mental anguish” and “for injury to professional reputation.”
These causations, argued the Government, were expressly non-physical and,
therefore, did not fall under the exclusionary language of section 104(a)(2). The
circuit court agreed and affirmed for the government on this first substantive claim.
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The circuit court then, after a lengthy discussion of Murphy’s constitutional
claim, concluded that Murphy’s award was in fact not income and, therefore, the
failure of section 104(a)(2) to exclude Murphy’s award from gross income resulted in
an unconstitutional taxation. The circuit court held that, because compensation for
personal injuries of any kind are awarded in order to make a person whole, they are
not awarded “in lieu of” something not ordinarily taxed—to wit, one’s well being—
and, therefore, cannot be considered income under the Sixteenth Amendment. The
circuit court arrived at its conclusion through an originalist interpretation of the
Sixteenth Amendment supported by the earliest versions of the Internal Revenue
Code that did not distinguish between physical and non-physical injuries. Offered as
additional support were an opinion of the Attorney General and a decision of the
Department of the Treasury, both issued in 1918, that suggested compensation for
personal injuries was not considered taxable income at that time.
The Government strongly disagreed, claiming that the historical exclusion of
compensation for personal injuries did not suggest a boundary of Congress’s taxing
authority. Instead, it represented merely a policy of not taxing a certain form of
compensation. Furthermore, the Government stated that Congress could repeal
section 104(a)(2) altogether and tax compensation for all personal injuries while
remaining within its taxing authority under the Sixteenth Amendment. This position
is derived from the understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment granted Congress
broad authority to “tax all gains except those specifically exempted,” and the
conclusion that monetary compensation received for whatever reason represents a
taxable “undeniable accession to wealth.” Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 430 (1955) (interpreting the predecessor of I.R.C. § 61(a)).
The circuit court responded to this argument stating, “[W]e reject the
Government’s breathtakingly expansive claim of congressional power under the
Sixteenth Amendment . . . [which] simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as
‘incomes’ every sort of revenue a taxpayer may receive.” This statement,
demonstrating the extent of the Court’s opposition to the Government’s position,
appears to indicate a serious conflict over the most fundamental of tax questions:
What is income?
It is difficult to predict the outcome of Murphy v. IRS “Part II” when the case
is revisited later this year. In the meantime, “Part I” raises some serious questions
about the current tax code and its attendant mechanisms. Was this unexpected
decision an extreme result of overly complex code language? Will it encourage the
IRS or Congress to review and revise ambiguous code sections? And, ultimately, will
Murphy v. IRS conclude with a decisive Supreme Court opinion refining the
definition of income, something the Supreme Court has done little of since Glenshaw
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Glass? We eagerly await the answers to these and other questions raised by Murphy v.
IRS.

